The Supreme Court has "long recognized that each medium of expression presents special First Amendment problems." 2 Social media has proved this statement exceedingly accurate. Social media has created a new frontier of constitutional issues, exacerbating the difficulty in defining the boundaries between free expression and criminal acts.
Social media is a necessary part of modern interaction. And although Facebook, widely considered the leader of the social media pack, 3 was created just for college students, social media is no longer exclusively for the youth. As such, 73% of online adults use social media sites, 4 56% of all Americans have at least one social media profile, 5 and the average age of Facebook users is most rapidly increasing in the 45-to-54 year-old age bracket. 6 Social media has become integral to connecting people around the world. But in an age where people are able post a steady stream of consciousness in 140 characters or less, and can constantly take pictures in order to walk their followers visually through their day, broader implications concerning both criminal law and constitutional law loom. How will the burgeoning use of social media impact America's laws? Does the Constitution protect people's tweets, Facebook posts, instapics, and other online social interactions? 7 Can social media activity expose the average American to criminal liability?
These questions are brought into even sharper focus when one considers the ways in which the government and private entities monitor social media sites. Sites such as Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, YouTube, and LinkedIn make no bones about the fact that users who post information on these websites have no expectation of privacy or exclusivity in that information. 8 And this fact, in the wake of constant BigBrother-like revelations of government Internet search capabilities, 9 raises real concern as to how people use, and the government polices, social media. 10 The First Amendment to the Constitution trumpets "Congress shall make no laws . . . abridging the freedom of speech." 11 While there has always been tension as to where to draw the line between free expression and criminal acts, in the age of social media this tension is unprecedented. As such, there is a need to revisit the way we protect and criminalize online speech. 12 Antiquated notions of freedom of speech and outmoded First Amendment doctrine do not suffice in an age where private thoughts and conversations are more often than not broadcasted in a public sphere. Obviously, the Framers of the Bill of Rights did not fully anticipate the advent of the Internet and the social media explosion.
Moreover, in developing First Amendment protections, the Supreme Court could not adequately forecast how integral the Internet and social media would become to everyday life. 13 As people live out their lives online, what is protected expression and what is criminal speech? This article begins to explore this fine distinction, and advocates for a shift in the way online speech is protected vis-à-vis the First Amendment. Part I provides examples of criminalized social media activity and explores why people seemingly treat online speech as private communications.
Part II looks at existing jurisprudence regarding the criminalization of speech and First Amendment protections. And Part III attempts to determine where to draw the line by advocating for a return to simpler times in First Amendment jurisprudence.
II.
The and child abuse. 23 It is time to refocus discourse on social media to understand how it aligns with First Amendment rights and basic criminal law principles as American arrests for social media activity are becoming increasingly commonplace. People are no longer only being prosecuted for online speech that is inherently criminal, such as fraud or defamation, 24 or social media activity depicting evidence of a crime that has been committed, such as the man who posted a picture of his dead wife on Facebook. 25 Americans are being placed in the criminal justice system for posting thoughts that express criminal ideas -words that foreshadow a criminal event with no other action in furtherance of the crime -what I call social media thoughtcrime. 26 Criminalizing thoughts, even when posted online, pose serious problems given that speech should be by default protected by the First Amendment, subject to (supposedly) narrow exceptions.
The Orwellian tenor may seem hyperbolic, but one just American Airlines responded, telling Sarah, "we take these threats very seriously. Your IP address and details will be forwarded to security and the FBI." 43 Sarah then attempted to double-back on her original tweet, saying that she was "stupid" and "scared," at one point saying her friend was responsible for the tweet. 44 The recantations were not enough, however, as Sarah later turned herself over to the Rotterdam police for questioning. 45 The unexpected twist to Sarah's story is that in an apparent show of solidarity, dozens of teenagers tweeted bomb "jokes" to American airlines, despite the risk of arrest. 46 The reactions to Sarah's arrest highlighted the fact that despite the increasing number social media-based arrests, either many still do not understand the potential gravitas of their online activity, or they are willing to risk arrest in an effort to protect their freedom of speech online.
In the above stories, is the social media activity insensitive? Yes. Crude? Most definitely. But criminal? This article proposes a framework for this much-needed debate. Although technically a public forum, social media sites have become a place of primary communication for many Americans. People, especially youth, feel comfortable sharing private thoughts online because they are sharing them with their "friends," not necessarily the world at large. 47 Society's expectation of privacy in its social media activity is important to consider when deciding when to criminalize social media thoughtcrimes.
These examples are important to keep in mind as such cases are litigated and First Amendment parameters around social media activity are defined. As it is the criminalization of this form of speech -asinine, insensitive, tasteless, and oftenjuvenile social media activity, designed to be shared with friends but is available to the world-that is relevant to this article.
B. Why (Young) People Consider Public Speech Private
The relationship between Americans and social media is 46 complicated. "In America, we live in a paradoxical world of privacy.
On one hand, teenagers reveal their intimate thoughts and behaviors online and, on the other hand, government agencies and marketers are collecting personal data about us." 48 However, it is not happenstance that people are beginning to share the most intimate aspects of their lives, including their thoughts, online. Social scientists have started to develop the social psychology behind the way in which people, especially young people, use social media, which should be considered when deciding how to define the constitutional boundaries around social media activity.
In many ways, social media has become part of human identity. It provides a forum for people to shape their perfect self -allowing them to portray to the world who they want it to see. 49 A person's behavior on social media is not necessarily an accurate reflection of self, but instead is an aggrandizement based on who that person wants to be, or who she or he believes those viewing the profile will find most attractive or appealing. 50 And while a person's social media footprint may not be an accurate reflection of who that person is, it is becoming a necessary tool for identity formation. It is well documented that an active social media presence is often seen as necessary to engage with and belong to broader society; 51 it is important for the creation and maintenance of social capital. 52 For many, this public activity is a critical vehicle of self-expression. It is important to remember when considering whether it is permissible to criminalize social media activity, that a person's social media behavior is often an online caricature. Social media is also increasingly important for identity development. As one author put it, it is a safe place to conduct adolescence. 53 Millennials have substituted in-person interaction with online communication, using the Internet as a primary vehicle for communication. 54 While adolescences and teenagers previously made the mistakes of youth in private, today, they often occur in a forum that someone is actively monitoring. 55 And replicating the natural maturation process, there is evidence that young people do not make the same misjudgments throughout their online lives; as people mature, their social media habits evolve with them. 56 Thus, the virtual aspects of adolescence and its attendant misjudgments and mistakes are necessary to consider when viewing social media activity in the criminal context.
Finally, it is important to remember how people are using social media at the most fundamental level. In an increasingly globalized world, social media is integral to maintaining relationships. 57 Data suggests that a majority of people do not use social media to interact with strangers, but instead, to stay connected with people with whom a relationship had been developed offline. 58 real-life friends (as opposed to virtual friends), and think that they have a modicum of control over the privacy of their postings, helps explain why people share private thoughts online, despite the fact that they are technically available to the world at large. 60 Though the stories of social media thoughtcrimes above may seem ludicrous in isolation, in context, it is not without reason why people share private thoughts online. 61 And although one can cast these examples off as extreme incidents of government overreach or isolated examples of social media misuse, where eventually the prosecution will be dropped or the jury will nullify, it is not clear that social media's current trajectory will prove this the case. As social media becomes ubiquitous, monitoring capabilities advance, and the fear of terrorism intensifies, social media thoughtcrime arrests will almost certainly continue to multiply in number. Therefore, the general context of social media use, and its modern day explosion is important to keep in mind when considering the First Amendment protections of social media activity, recognizing that prior First Amendment doctrines and antiquated notions of private versus public fora may not neatly fit the online arena. While the First Amendment declares that Congress, and by incorporation the states, shall make no laws abridging the freedom of speech, the Supreme Court has made clear that free speech protections are not absolute. 63 What is also clear, at least in theory, is that " [t] he First Amendment protects a wide array of distasteful, disturbing, defamatory or factually false, profane, 'anti-American,' and hateful speech." 64 States and the federal government tend to criminalize speech intended to cause direct and imminent injury, which courts often hold to be a permissible restriction on free speech. 65 Yet when it comes to proscribing unpopular speech, the Supreme Court has tended to view such restraints with intense skepticism, intimating that crass speech deserves just as much protection, if not more, than other types of expression. 66 To test First Amendment boundaries, the Supreme Court first looks at whether an activity constitutes "speech;" 67 and if it does, the Court then decides whether it falls outside of constitutional protections. 68 
III. Protection of

A. Online Activity Is Speech
For the purpose of social media postings, two categories of 63. See, e.g., Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682-85 (1986) speech are especially relevant. First, there is "pure speech," which consists of communicative thoughts or words that are verbalized and/or written. 69 This category of speech would seemingly encompass Facebook statuses, tweets, and other means by which users express their thoughts through writing, because the Supreme Court made clear that acts "disclosing" or "publishing" information constitutes "pure speech." 70 And in case there was any doubt whether online activity is speech protected by the First Amendment, the Supreme Court has clearly held that online speech deserves the complete protections of the First Amendment. 71 Thus, although when the Court first used the term "pure speech" it may not have envisioned social media activity, such as tweeting, as conveying "pure speech," it ostensibly falls within the First Amendment definition and is therefore deserving of the highest level of constitutional protection. 72 Then there is symbolic expression, which is also "speech" for First Amendment purposes, and therefore privy to its protections. To determine whether symbolic expression falls under the First Amendment definition of "speech," the Supreme Court uses a two-part test, asking whether (1) there is intent to convey a particularized message; and (2) there is a great likelihood that those encountering the message would understand it. 73 First Amendment communicative expression would appear to cover some instances of online picture posting, 74 sharing certain content or webpages, 75 retweeting, reposting other people's thoughts, or even "liking" a Facebook page or status. 76 Thus, the First Amendment should protect, in theory, a wide array of social media activity unless it falls into one of the limited predefined exceptions previously laid out by the Supreme Court.
B. Current Exceptions to First Amendment Free Speech Protections
Just because some social media usage falls within the First Amendment definition of "speech" does not automatically guarantee all social media activity has constitutional protection. The Supreme Court has carved out certain types of speech that do not fall within the ambit of First Amendment safeguards. Categories of unprotected speech include: advocacy intended and likely to incite imminent lawless action; 77 obscenity; 78 defamation; 79 child pornography; 80 "fighting words"; 81 fraud; 82 true threats; 83 speech integral to criminal conduct; 84 and speech presenting a grave and imminent threat the government has the power to prevent. 85 In the eyes of the Supreme Court, this speech is undeserving of First Amendment protections because "such utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by social interest in order and morality." 86 The State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action." 92 The Court drew a distinction between advocating illegal acts versus "steeling" a group for violent behavior. 93 Recognizing that the concept of "imminence" is inherently ambiguous, the Court attempted to clarify the imminent lawlessness exception in Hess v. Indiana. 94 Here, a student protester faced arrest for statements made at a university rally, where the sheriff overheard the protester saying, "We'll take the fucking street later" (or something to that effect). 95 The sheriff arrested the student for disorderly conduct, which the student challenged on First Amendment grounds. The State of Indiana defended the arrest by arguing the speech incited imminent lawless action, and therefore was not protected by the First Amendment. 96 The Court disagreed, clarifying that unless there is "evidence, or rational inference from the import of the language, that his words were intended to produce, and likely to produce, imminent disorder, those words could not be punished by the State on the ground that they had a tendency to lead to violence." 97 The Court sided with Watts. Calling his speech "political hyperbole," the Court held that Watts's speech did not constitute a "true threat" removing it from First Amendment protections, because: one, the comments were made accompanying a political debate; two, the threats were conditional in nature; and three, when putting the speech into context, the listening audience did not perceive Watts' words to be threatening -in fact, many listeners laughed at Watts' remarks. 103 Context was essential to the Court when deciding whether speech is a "true threat" allowing the government to criminalize it. Still, although the Court found that Watts' speech was not a true threat excepting it from the First Amendment, the Court did little to explain what would be a true threat, instead framing its holding in the negative.
In Virginia v. Black, a plurality of the Court attempted to clarify the definition of a "true threat." 104 Writing for four justices, Justice O'Connor explained that a true threat simply requires a speaker to convey a threatening message to a wider audience. 105 To her, it did not matter whether the speaker actually intended "to carry out the threat.
Rather, a prohibition on true threats 'protect[s] individuals from the fear of violence' and 'from the disruption that fear engenders,' in addition to protecting people 'from the possibility that the threatened violence will occur. '" 106 Under this broad articulation of the true threat doctrine, it is arguable that the broadcasting of a threatening message is enough to except the message from First Amendment protections, regardless of the intent of the speaker or the effect on the audience.
C. The Difficulty of Applying Present First Amendment Exceptions to Social Media Thoughtcrime
It is relatively clear that the social media thoughtcrimes described in Part I do not fall under most of the exceptions to the First Amendment. 107 It is murky, however, as to whether the online activity is excepted from the First Amendment under the true threats or imminent lawlessness doctrines, and the answer will often turn on the identity of the decisionmaker. It is for these reasons that neither test provides an adequate measure by which to judge whether the First Amendment protects social media activity.
Brandenburg Does Not Work
While most view Brandenburg as a ringing endorsement of free speech rights, it has left open more questions than it has answered. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has done little to resolve the questions left in the wake of Brandenburg, 108 the most glaring of which, is how to define imminence. While the Court said in a future case, that if the unlawful activity advocated is weeks or months down the road, it will likely not be considered imminent, short of that, there are no clear parameters. 109 What is imminent, therefore, necessarily relies on the discretion of the factfinder. And while most legal tests rely on discretion to some degree, there needs to be clearer guidelines when considering First Amendment rights in the context of social media activity, as the everyday activities of the vast majority of Americans are implicated. There is also a question as to whether Brandenburg applies to private acts, or if it is solely limited to public speech. 111 Some argue that speech must be communicated in a public setting for Brandenburg to apply. 112 The question of whether Brandenburg is limited to public speech becomes even further complicated when asked in the social media context, as some social media users often think their activity is private, when technically most activity is public in some sense. Therefore, should the amount of protection social media activities receive turn on a user's privacy setting? Is online speech truly private given the level of monitoring that occurs by both public and private actors? These gray areas leave in limbo quasi-private online acts and do not clearly explain how Brandenburg applies to social media activity.
While Brandenburg was a useful step in the evolution of freedom of speech, as it stands now, the imminent lawlessness test applied in Brandenburg is hard to apply in the social media context and may produce varying results. presently stands, it is an ineffective means to regulate online speech and test its validity under the First Amendment.
The True Threats Doctrine Is Unwieldy
The Supreme Court has never given an adequate definition of what constitutes a true threat, and its one attempt to provide clarity further obfuscated the issue. As such, there is a fracas in the lower courts applying the true threats doctrine, with all forms of tests emerging when applying the amorphous First Amendment exception. 113 The uncertainty shrouding the true threats doctrine is evidenced by the fact that there is even a question if the true threats doctrine is a standalone test, or merely a refinement or subpart of the test announced in Brandenburg. 114 Courts are divided as to whether there needs to be identifiable targets of the threats, or if a general threat is enough to except speech from the First Amendment. 115 Some courts have interpreted Justice O'Connor's definition of true threats to subsume every threat made in public, regardless of the intent of the speaker. 116 Others believe the true threats definition used in Black requires intent on the part of the speaker -that the speaker must have intended to carry out the threat that she or he publically conveyed; yet whether this is a subjective or objective standard of intent divides the courts. 117 Again, the ambiguities raise challenging questions in the social media context, and may yield different results depending on the arbiter. 118 113. See Paul T. Crane, "True Threats" and the Issue of Intent, 92 VA. L. REV. 1225 REV. , 1265 REV. -69 (2006 ; Steven G. Gey, Cross Burning, Intimidation, and Free Speech, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1287 , 1326 -27, 1331 -33 (2005 119 Their reasoning is that privately communicated threats receive little or no protection under the First Amendment, and that the true threats inquiry is therefore irrelevant to threats made in private. 120 However, this raises questions as to how to define publically-communicated threats versus privatelycommunicated threats. Should it depend on the number of views a post receives, whether only a social media user's "friends" can view the threat, or does it depend on how many "friends" a social media user has? Alternatively, are social media posts punishable when the public at large can view them? If someone intended to convey a private threat online, is it no longer private because of the inherent lack of privacy on social media networks?
Applying the concept of a "true threat" to the online sphere is like trying to fit a round peg in a square hole. Very little of what is conveyed online is accurate, and much online speech is flat-out false, even when people are portending to portray their personal life. The concept of "truth" is fleeting online, and therefore, the true threats doctrine is dangerous to apply given the context.
Like Brandenburg, there are too many questions presently left open by Black for the true threats doctrine to be useful in defining whether social media activity should be protected or not. As explained in the next section, it is time to move away from the current First Amendment exceptions when deciding whether social media activity is punishable. There should be one question based on established Supreme Court precedent that authorities and courts should ask when deciding whether the First Amendment protects social media speech: Does the social media activity create a clear and present danger? If not, the First Amendment protects it. It is important to define the line between online speech and criminal activity as social media becomes an indispensable part of basic human expression; "What is a threat must be distinguished from what is constitutionally protected." 121 Most would agree that arrest and prosecution for social media thoughtcrimes is a waste of scarce resources, unnecessarily involving young people in the criminal justice system. 122 Conversely, many would argue that we should not tie the hands of law enforcement, and that policing online activity is a valid method of ferreting out nefarious actors. 123 Given this tension, when attempting to understand how social media should be used vis-à-vis the criminal justice system, law enforcement, prosecutors, and the public need a simple directive to guide the criminalization of online speech. Luckily, the Supreme Court, through First Amendment maverick Justice Holmes, announced a First Amendment test, the clear and present danger test, that with some refinement may provide the necessary answer to the First Amendment online speech conundrum.
IV. Protecting Online
A. The Development of Clear and Present Danger
The Supreme Court was at best apathetic and at worst openly hostile to the idea of free speech up until the early 1900s. Then, with Justice Brandeis at his side, Justice Holmes began to forge a new path in First Amendment jurisprudence, 121. Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 707 (1969) . 122. If nothing but anecdotal evidence, the public reactions to the stories outlined in Part I, including the petition for Justin Carter, and the grand jury's failure to indict Cameron D'Ambrosio, show that the public in some regard does not think that this form of speech should be criminally sanctioned. with many crediting the duo for the free speech protections we have today. 124 In a 1919 trio of cases, Justice Holmes wrote three First Amendment opinions for a unanimous Court. 125 Although the Court decided all three cases against the person claiming free speech protections, one case in particular stands out for its rhetorical endorsement of the First Amendment.
In Schenck v. United States, Charles Schenck, a popular socialist, was arrested for distributing flyers to American service members that asserted the draft was the equivalent of involuntary servitude in violation of the Thirteenth Amendment. 126 For his actions, authorities charged Schenck with violating the Espionage Act, as he was conspiring "to cause insubordination." 127 Before the Supreme Court, Schenck argued his arrest violated his First Amendment rights, but the Court, through Justice Holmes, affirmed his conviction. 128 In finding that the arrest and conviction did not infringe upon Schenck's First Amendment rights, Holmes first used the language of clear and present danger, saying:
The question in every case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent. It is a question of proximity and degree. 129 Holmes provided a pragmatic test relying on imminence and context, because "the character of every act depends upon the 124. It has been hypothesized that Justice Holmes' clear and present danger standard was inspired in part by his relationship with Judge Learned Hand, who had announced a similar incitement test for advocacy of criminal activity. Masses Pub. Co v. Patten, 244 F. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1917 Swift & Co. v. United States. 138 In Swift, Justice Holmes clearly laid out what was necessary for criminal attempt, proclaiming: "Where acts alone are not sufficient in themselves to produce a result which the law seeks to prevent . . . but require further acts . . . to bring that result to pass, an intent to bring it to pass is necessary to produce a dangerous probability that it will happen." 139 Justice Holmes went on to say, "[n]ot every act that may be done with intent to produce an unlawful result is unlawful, or constitutes an attempt." 140 Using the same language that he used in Schenck, Holmes reminded that it is still always going to be ". . .a question of proximity and degree." 141 It was the "well known" criminal law doctrine of attempt as articulated in Swift, that Justice Holmes believed should guide the clear and present danger First Amendment test. 142 Then, to solidify his place in First Amendment jurisprudence, Justice Holmes dissented once again with Justice Brandeis in Gitlow v. New York. 143 In arguing that the prosecution of the petitioner under a state criminal anarchy statute for publishing and distributing various socialist pamphlets violated the First Amendment, Justice Holmes wrote this now famous passage:
Every idea is an incitement. It offers itself for belief and if believed it is acted on unless some other belief outweighs it or some failure of energy stifles the movement at its birth. The only difference between the expression of an opinion and an incitement in the narrower sense is the speaker's enthusiasm for the result. Eloquence may set fire to reason. But whatever may be AMERICA (Metropolitan Book 2013) .
138. Abrams, 250 U.S. at 628 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 139. Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375, 396 (1905 ). 140. Id. at 402. 141. Id. 142. Id. 143. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925 .
thought of the redundant discourse before us it had no chance of starting a present conflagration. If in the long run the beliefs expressed in proletarian dictatorship are destined to be accepted by the dominant forces of the community, the only meaning of free speech is that they should be given their chance and have their way. 144
As explained below, it is Justice Holmes' articulation of the clear and present danger standard in Schenck, constructed on the foundation of Swift and elaborated upon in Abrams and Gitlow, that should be the standard by which social media speech is considered for First Amendment purposes.
B. Online Speech Should Be Judged by the Clear and Present Danger Test
The issues surrounding social media are so complex that the relative simplicity of the clear and present danger test, grounded in the well-aged principles of criminal attempt, would be helpful when deciding whether social media activity is constitutionally protected. 145 There is a multitude of benefits of applying the clear and present danger test as announced in Schenck and clarified in Abrams and Gitlow to social media speech. The clear and present danger test has the imminence component that makes Brandenburg speech protective, and is especially salient in the online context. 146 The imminence component is borne in part from the idea that if the criminal act is not imminent, a gooddoer has time to intercede, or the speaker has time to change her mind. 147 This idea is magnified ten-fold in the social media context, as it is a medium of communication designed for immediate response. Therefore, if a person truly thought the teenager in Chicago was going to shoot up his neighborhood if the jury eventually found George Zimmerman not guilty, someone would have certainly had the chance to respond and intercede, telling him that even if he was serious, that there are better ways he can express his frustrations. Requiring there to be imminent danger ensures social media users who publish online threats have a chance to recognize their foolishness and retract their statement, or be persuaded to change their mind prior to risking arrest.
In a similar vein, the clear and present danger test draws from criminal law and looks at the motive of the speaker and whether he or she had actual criminal intent, and then whether the speaker took some action in furtherance of that intent. And this will often require more than just an online posting, which is so easy to do with very little thought, and will necessitate some further corroboration of the user's intent. Further, in line with general principles of criminal attempt, there will also have to be proof of some action in furtherance of the crime discussed via social media to warrant arrest and allow conviction.
Before social media thoughtcrime is punishable, the government would have to show that the social media user actually intended to commit a crime and has the ability to do so. Another attractive aspect of the clear and present danger test is that it takes into account the context of speech and the audience receiving it. People say things online that they would never say in person, because for many, social media is a way to aggrandize in a setting with limited repercussions. This context is crucial when deciding whether speech constitutes a clear and present danger -when there is just social media activity with nothing more, the answer is likely it does not. Intimate conversations that were had in the living room in front of the television, at the neighborhood bar, or on playground are taking place on social media platforms. Therefore, treating social media speech in the same manner as speech shouted at public rallies or mass-distributed pamphlets is in many was nonsensical. However, criminalizing social media activity that creates imminent danger has applicability that is more sensible, with the understanding that words alone rarely can constitute a significant enough threat to remove the speech from the protections of the First Amendment. 148 In situations where an online speaker does intend to threaten his audience on a social media network and the threat is seemingly imminent, the next step would be to put the threat in context, and determine whether the person who is viewing the threat would perceive it as such. In other words, did the person with whom the speaker was communicating feel immediately threatened by the post. In that case, similar to the common law principles of assault, perhaps the speech can be criminalized, because the speech ". . .operates more like a physical action than a verbal or symbolic communication of ideas or emotions." 149 But there should also be an objective analysis as to whether it was reasonable for the person to feel threatened given the surrounding context. 150 Some may posit that posting criminal thoughts or threats in the public sphere is enough to warrant the exemption of speech from the First Amendment given the harm that can result. This argument is based on the fear that such speech engenders and the panic it can cause. 151 While the argument is well taken, the threatening, bullying, and violent language used regularly online undermines this argument. If threats online, in whatever form, can be criminalized, the slippery slope is actually a vertical line. Moreover, there is a difference between making threats with people in close physical proximity, and posting threats in an online forum where the speaker may be continents away. Taking the classic example used by Justice Holmes, shouting "fire" in a crowded theater is unlikely to have the same effect in a popular chatroom. 152 And in the instances that it does have a similar effect, where social media activity does create mass hysteria, in that case perhaps abrogation of free speech rights is necessary. 153 Another counterargument this proposed solution is likely to face is that it essentially requires law enforcement to wait until the crime is near completion, which, as seen in countless examples in a Post-9/11 world, could have disastrous consequences. My thesis, however, does not reach government monitoring of social media -although there are certainly constitutional issues that abound as a result of such programs. It also does not prevent law enforcement from using social media as a tool for further investigation -there may very well be instances where a social media post can give rise to reasonable suspicion, allowing limited law enforcement interaction, that social media activity can "counsel" further investigation. 154 My argument is simply stating that it should be rare a case where a person's speech through a social media 152. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) ("The most stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing panic.").
153. I am sure some would argue that the hypothesis outlined herein is not protective enough. See, e.g., supra note 145. However, this article rests on the assumption that there will not be a tectonic shift in First Amendment jurisprudence in the near future, and therefore works with the precedent presently on the books.
154. Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1683, 1696 (2014) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
outlet results in arrest and prosecution. 155 And in deciding whether social media speech can be criminalized, or whether the First Amendment protects it, with protection of speech serving as the default, the clear and present danger test can serve as a commonsense guide for government officials.
Although not necessarily one's first impulse, returning to nearly century-old precedent and defining 21st century online speech protections in accordance with criminal law is internally consistent; harmonizing speech advocating criminal acts with common law attempt principles makes sense. The concept of a "clear and present danger" is something that the average person can conceptualize and think about as he or she engages in online social media activity, and it is something police and prosecutors can latch onto when deciding whether further action is warranted. It refocuses the protections of speech with an eye as to what is criminal versus what is socially acceptable in a way that the average person can understand.
V. Conclusion
Some may argue that social media thoughtcrime deserves no protection as it adds no value to the marketplace, and after all, the First Amendment protects speech for its value to society. 156 Although this First Amendment concept is important, it is just as important to remember that the First Amendment was also designed to protect an individual's right of expression. 157 Moreover, some of the speech exampled above does add to the value of the marketplace of ideas and democracy in its own way. Yes, at first blush the examples seem to consist solely of silly posts made by reckless young people with no larger value. However, each post has its own place within larger social discourse. For example, while Justin Carter may have been joking (allegedly) about shooting up a school -in his own way he was highlighting the absurdity and the inhumanity of the Sandy Hook shootings. The Chicago teenager reacting to the Zimmerman trial was adding his commentary to a salient social-political issue in which almost all of America was engaged. While Sarah the Dutch teenager may have been pulling an online prank when tweeting about placing a bomb on an American Airlines plane, those who tweeted similar sentiments after her were doing so in a seeming show of subversive solidarity, protesting her arrest. Finally, the British youths that were arrested for using popular slang is just further evidence of a transatlantic and crossgenerational communication divide that has always existed.
While it is easy to write off social media speech as valueless, and therefore undeserving of First Amendment protections, this entire article is premised on the fact that there is value to be had by allowing people to express themselves via social media. That social media expression is often a method of engaging in larger social dialogue regardless of how crude the expression might be. And even when social media activity is not contributing to a larger social dialogue, social media is an important tool of self-expression. It is a primary means of communication for people around the world, supplanting speech that was previously conducted in private that people would not dream of criminalizing. Finally, it is critical to remember that freedom of speech is the baseline, and as the Internet becomes even more deeply entrenched in the human experience, the vigorous protection of online speech, including social media speech, will be of paramount importance.
